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CRIMINAL LAW
I. EVIDENCE OF VICTIM'S MENTAL TRAUMA RELEVANT TO PROVE
CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT AND RULE AGAINST INCONSISTENT
VERDICTS IN CRIMINAL CASES ABOLISHED
In State v. Alexander' the South Carolina Supreme Court estab-
lished that evidence of a victim's mental trauma is relevant to prove
criminal sexual conduct.' The court also abolished the rule that a crim-
inal defendant is entitled to a new trial when the jury reaches inconsis-
tent verdicts.3
Alexander involved allegations of armed robbery, kidnapping, and
criminal sexual conduct in the first degree arising out of an incident
between Richard Alexander, the defendant, and Ms. Hendrix, the pros-
ecutrix. The facts were in great dispute. Alexander testified that Ms.
Hendrix agreed to have sex with him for money and that he and the
prosecutrix parked on a deserted road and began to have sex. Ms. Hen-
drix stopped the sexual activity and he refused to pay. Upset by the
turn of events, Alexander stole cocaine from Ms. Hendrix's purse. Ms.
Hendrix then drove Alexander to his sister's house.
4
Ms. Hendrix told a different story. She alleged that Alexander
held a knife to her throat, forced her into a car, and drove to a de-
serted road. Alexander then forced her to have sexual intercourse with
him three times. He demanded money, and then released her. After
first stopping off at a bar in Greenville, Ms. Hendrix got something to
eat and went to a hospital."
The jury convicted Alexander of kidnapping and criminal sexual
conduct in the third degree. Alexander appealed. Alexander asserted
that he deserved a new trial for two reasons. First, Alexander argued
"that the trial judge erred in allowing Ms. Hendrix to testify, over his
objection, about the emotional consequences resulting from the alleged
rape." Second, Alexander argued that the jury's verdicts were incon-
sistent.7 Addressing Alexander's first argument, the court initially
noted the standard that courts apply to determine whether evidence is
1. 401 S.E.2d 146 (S.C. 1991).
2. Id. at 149.
3. Id. at 150.
4. Id. at 147-48.
5. Id. at 147.
6. Id. at 148.
7. Id. at 149.
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relevant: "Evidence is relevant if it tends to establish or make more or
less probable some matter in issue upon which it directly or indirectly
bears." 8 Because Alexander's argument raised an issue of first impres-
sion in South Carolina, the court looked to other jurisdictions for guid-
ance.9 The court relied on authority from Missouri 0 and Arizona" and
held that evidence of an alleged rape victim's "mental trauma is rele-
vant to prove the elements of criminal sexual conduct, including the
lack of consent.' 2 The court explained, "Evidence of behavioral and
personality changes tends to establish or make more or less probable
that the offense occurred."' s
The court next considered whether the trial judge nonetheless
should have excluded the evidence on the ground that it was unduly
prejudicial to the defendant. The court noted that the "overwhelming
majority rule [is] that relevant evidence may be excluded for undue
prejudice even though no specific exclusionary rule requires exclu-
sion.'1 4 The court adopted the pertinent part of Rule 403 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence,' 5 which states that "[a]lthough relevant, evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." 6 The court applied this
test and found that the evidence of Ms. Hendrix's emotional trauma
was unduly prejudicial and should not have been admitted. 7 The court
reversed the decision and remanded the case for a new trial. The court
did not explain why the impact of the evidence was unduly prejudicial
to Alexander or why this impact substantially outweighed the proba-
tive value of the evidence.'
8
The court also abolished the rule against inconsistent verdicts in
criminal cases.' 9 The rule decrees that a criminal defendant is entitled
to a new trial if the verdicts are inconsistent. 0 Apparently, South Car-
8. Id. at 148 (citing State v. Schmidt, 288 S.C. 301, 303, 342 S.E.2d 401, 403
(1986)).
9. Id.
10. State v. Burke, 719 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Philips, 670
S.W.2d 28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Johnson, 637 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
11. State v. Thomas, 130 Ariz. 432, 636 P.2d 1214 (1981); State v. Cummings, 148
Ariz. 588, 716 P.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1985).
12. Alexander, 401 S.E.2d at 149.
13. Id. (citing State v. Schmidt, 288 S.C. 301, 342 S.E.2d 401 (1986)).
14. Id. (citing 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAs AT COMMON LAW § 10a (Tillers
rev. 1983)).
15. FED. R. Evw. 403.
16. FED. R. EVID. 403, quoted in Alexander, 401 S.E.2d at 149.
17. Alexander, 401 S.E.2d at 149.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 150.
20. Id. at 149.
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olina courts have never used the rule to grant a new trial.21 The Alex-
ander court noted that the United States Supreme Court abolished the
rule in the federal system in 1932.22 The United States Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed the 1932 decision in United States v. Powell.25
In Powell the Court refused to grant a new trial to a defendant
found guilty of compound offenses but innocent of the predicate of-
fenses.24 The Court explained that juries return inconsistent verdicts
for various reasons, including mistake, compromise, or lenity.25 The
Court decided that the defendant was adequately protected "against
jury irrationality or error by the independent review of the sufficiency
of the evidence undertaken by the trial and appellate courts.
'26
The Powell Court decided the issue solely in its supervisory capac-
ity over the federal system.27 Thus, the Court's decision is not binding
on state courts. The South Carolina Supreme Court nonetheless found
the Powell reasoning compelling and abolished the rule against incon-
sistent verdicts.
28
The impact of the new rules announced in Alexander remains to
be seen. The rule against inconsistent verdicts essentially did not exist
in South Carolina, and its abolition may be of limited significance. As
to the admission of mental trauma evidence in criminal sexual conduct
trials, the burden will fall on the state's trial judges to ascertain when
the probative value of postevent evidence of mental trauma is substan-
21. Id. at 150. For example, in State v. Hall, 268 S.C. 524, 235 S.E.2d 112 (1977), a
Greenville County court convicted the defendant of murder, assault and battery with
intent to kill, armed robbery, and carrying a concealed weapon, but found the defendant
not guilty of murder while in the commission of armed robbery with a deadly weapon.
Id. at 526, 235 S.E.2d at 113. Although the verdicts were "obviously inconsistent," the
Hall court refused to grant the defendant a new trial because the defendant was not
prejudiced by the inconsistency. Id. at 528, 235 S.E.2d at 114.
22. See Alexander, 401 S.E.2d at 149 (citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390
(1932)).
23. 469 U.S. 57 (1984).
24. The Government conceded for the purposes of review that the verdicts were
inconsistent. Id. at 61 n.5.
25. Id. at 65.
26. Id. at 67.
27. Id. at 65.
28. State v. Alexander, 401 S.E.2d 146, 150 (S.C. 1991). Also, the Alexander court
approvingly referred to Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 341 S.E.2d 216 (1986), a recent
decision by the Georgia Supreme Court that abolished the rule against inconsistent ver-
dicts in criminal cases. Alexander, 401 S.E.2d at 150.
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tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.
David W. Plowden
II. CONSECUTIVE LIFE SENTENCES TREATED AS ONE GENERAL LIFE
SENTENCE FOR PAROLE PURPOSES AND GREAT DEFERENCE GIVEN TO
TRIAL JUDGES IN CONTINUING JURY DELIBERATIONS IN CAPITAL CASES
In State v. Atkins29 the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld a
convicted murderer's death sentence. The court held that the trial
judge correctly stated the law when he charged the jury that for pur-
poses of parole eligibility, multiple life sentences are treated as one life
sentence and that parole eligibility for individuals sentenced to multi-
ple life terms is twenty years.30 The supreme court also held that the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion by requiring the jury to con-
tinue deliberation after the jury indicated that it could not reach a
decision following three and one-half hours of deliberation.
3 1
In 1985 Joseph Earnest Atkins killed his elderly father and a thir-
teen-year-old neighbor with a shotgun. 32 At Atkins's first trial the jury
convicted him of murder and sentenced him to death. The supreme
court affirmed the convictions, but reversed the death sentences and
remanded the case for resentencing 3 The resentencing jury sentenced
Atkins to death again. Atkins appealed.
3 4
Although the supreme court considered numerous issues on ap-
peal, the two most significant involved a pair of supplemental jury in-
structions. During its deliberations the jury sent a question to the
judge that requested whether the jury could recommend consecutive
life sentences. The judge, believing the inquiry to be motivated by pa-
role considerations, charged the jury that it could not recommend con-
secutive life sentences. He added that Atkins would be eligible for pa-
role in twenty years even if given consecutive life sentences.35
29. 399 S.E.2d 760 (S.C. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2913 (1991).
30. Id. at 763.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 761. The circumstances that surround these crimes are set forth in
greater detail in State v. Atkins, 293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E.2d 302 (1987), appeal after re-
mand, 399 S.E.2d 760 (S.C. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2913 (1991).
33. Atkins, 293 S.C. at 301, 360 S.E.2d at 306. The court found that the trial judge
erred in denying Atkins his statutory right to have his counsel examine prospective ju-
rors prior to their disqualification on the basis of their opposition to the death penalty.
Id. at 296-98, 360 S.E.2d at 303-04 (construing S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(D) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1990)).
34. Atkins, 399 S.E.2d at 761.
35. Id. at 763.
1991]
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The supreme court upheld the instruction. The court held that for
purposes of parole life sentences cannot be aggregated. A man lives
only one life. The majority concluded that consecutive life sentences
should be considered one general sentence of life for which parole eligi-
bility is twenty years.3"
Justice Finney found this holding to be incorrect and illogical. He
noted that consecutive sentences "are intended to run one after the
other, as would statutory periods of time required to qualify for parole
eligibility. '37 From this proposition he reasoned that "[u]nder the ma-
jority's holding, the consecutive provision for multiple life sentences
would become a nullity. ' 3s
Justice Finney's criticism is valid. Under the majority's holding a
person sentenced to ten consecutive life sentences, like a person sen-
tenced to one life sentence, is eligible for parole in twenty years. Fur-
thermore, a person sentenced to consecutive life sentences is eligible
for parole in the same amount of time as a person sentenced to concur-
rent life sentences. Thus, the majority's holding erases not only any
distinction between single and multiple sentences, but also the distinc-
tion between concurrent and consecutive life sentences."9
Although one may argue the merits of the court's decision, the
holding is clear. When multiple life sentences are handed down,
whether they are imposed consecutively or concurrently is irrelevant
for parole eligibility purposes. They will be considered as one life sen-
tence for which parole eligibility is twenty years.
After the jury had heard four and one-half days of testimony, it
deliberated for three and one-half hours. The jury then communicated
to the trial court that it could not reach a decision and asked whether
to continue deliberation. The judge responded that "'three and a half
hours would not be sufficient for you to have deliberated fully ....
[Y]our decision must be a unanimous decision of all twelve of you.' ",40
The judge sent the jury home for the night. After deliberating one and
one-half hours the next morning the jury recommended that Atkins
36. Id. This issue can no longer arise in the sentencing phase of a capital case. In
State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991), the court overruled State v. Atkins, 293
S.C. 294, 360 S.E.2d 302 (1987), and held that parole considerations may not enter into a
capital sentencing decision and that trial judges should not inform sentencing juries
about parole. 406 S.E.2d at 321. This issue can still arise, however, in parole hearings
before the Board of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-
610 (Law. Co-op. 1989); id. § 16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
37. Atkins, 399 S.E.2d at 766 (Finney, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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receive the death penalty for both murder convictions."
The majority found no error in the supplemental charge. The
court cited State v. Bennett"2 for the proposition that the length of
time that a jury deliberates rests in the sound discretion of the trial
judge.4' The court concluded that the trial judge did not abuse his dis-
cretion by requiring the jury to continue deliberating beyond three and
one-half hours after a four and one-half day trial.
44
Justice Finney disagreed. He found that this supplemental charge
"tended to coerce the jury into reaching a unanimous verdict.'4
5 Jus-
tice Finney quoted section 16-3-20(C) of the South Carolina Code,'
46
which sets forth a clear directive when a jury is unable to decide on a
sentence in a capital case:
In the event that all members of the jury after a reasonable delibera-
tion cannot agree on a recommendation as to whether or not the
death sentence should be imposed on a defendant found guilty of
murder, the trial judge shall dismiss such jury and shall sentence the
defendant to life imprisonment.. ..47
The main reason for giving a supplemental charge to a deadlocked
jury is to avoid the cost of a retrial.4 This concern is diffused, however,
by section 16-3-20(C), which provides for the imposition of a sentence
of life imprisonment when a jury is deadlocked in the sentencing phase
of a capital case. This statute appears to restrict judicial discretion in
continuing jury deliberations in capital cases if the jurors disagree on a
sentence after a reasonable period of deliberation.
It is not clear whether Justice Finney would hold that three and
one-half hours is "reasonable deliberation" after a four and one-half
day trial because he did not directly criticize the majority's reliance on
State v. Bennett.49 He did remark, however, that because of the
"unique nature of the death penalty, practices allowed in other non-
capital criminal cases may be constitutionally impermissible if utilized
in a capital case."50
41. Record at 1211, 1227.
42. 259 S.C. 50, 190 S.E.2d 497 (1972).
43. Atkins, 399 S.E.2d at 763.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 766 (Finney, J., dissenting).
46. S.C. CoD ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
47. Id. (emphasis added), quoted in Atkins, 399 S.E.2d at 766 (Finney, J.
dissenting).
48. See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238 (1988); State v. Bennett, 259
S.C. 50, 54, 190 S.E.2d 497, 498 (1972).
49. 259 S.C. 50, 190 S.E.2d 497 (1972).
50. Atkins, 399 S.E.2d at 766-67 (Finney, J., dissenting) (citing Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668, 705 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
1991]
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The defendant in Bennett was charged with kidnapping. After
several hours of deliberation, the foreman of the jury announced that
the jury was unable to reach a verdict.5 1 The trial judge did not declare
a mistrial, but instead gave the following supplemental charge: "'I
don't want anybody to give up a conscientious opinion, but very fre-
quently, with the interchange of ideas between members of a jury, the
jury can come to a consensus; and if the jury can reach a verdict, it
saves a retrial of the case.' "52 Subsequently, the jury found the defend-
ant guilty of kidnapping. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld
the conviction and noted that "[a]fter a trial of the length of this one,
the judge would have been derelict in his duty if he had declared a
mistrial at this stage of the proceedings instead of requiring the jurors
to continue their deliberations.
'53
The desire to avoid a retrial could not have motivated the Atkins
court. Atkins involved a capital crime. A hung jury would have re-
sulted in a life sentence under the statute. The court's holding none-
theless leaves a question unanswered: What constitutes reasonable de-
liberation under section 16-3-20(C)?
Robert F. Daley, Jr.
III. A SINGLE TRIAL FOR ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT CRIMINAL
SEXUAL CONDUCT AND ASSAULT AND BATTERY OF HIGH AND
AGGRAVATED NATURE DID NOT CONSTITUTE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In State v. Frazier54 the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld a
defendant's convictions in a single trial for assault with intent to com-
mit criminal sexual conduct and assault and battery of a high and ag-
gravated nature. The court reasoned that the convictions "were for dif-
ferent acts constituting separate offenses and did not violate [the
defendant's] constitutional right against double jeopardy."'5
On June 24, 1987, Sheila Oliphant was walking home when the
defendant approached her from behind and grabbed her. After strug-
gling with Oliphant, the defendant dragged her into the woods where
he ripped off her shorts and pulled off her underwear. The defendant
attempted to loosen his pants but stopped when he saw the headlights
of an approaching car. He then told Oliphant that he was going to kill
her. The defendant placed his knee on Oliphant's chest and began to
51. Bennett, 259 S.C. at 54, 190 S.E.2d at 498.
52. Id.
53. Id. Unfortunately, the opinion gives no indication of how long the trial lasted.
54. 397 S.E.2d 93 (S.C. 1990).
55. Id. at 94-95.
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choke her, but fled when the approaching car did not drive away.5s
The defendant was indicted and tried for criminal sexual conduct
in the first degree and assault and battery with intent to kill. The trial
court directed a verdict of acquittal on the charge of criminal sexual
conduct in the first degree and instructed the jury on the offenses of
assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first de-
gree, assault and battery with intent to kill, and assault and battery of
a high and aggravated nature. The jury found the defendant guilty of
both assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. 57
The defendant argued on appeal that his conviction on both of-
fenses violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of both the United States
and South Carolina Constitutions. The Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides in part that no person shall "be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb. '5s The defendant contended that he was convicted for two of-
fenses based on only one act. The majority in Frazier disagreed with
the defendant and held that the evidence supported the jury's finding
that the defendant committed two separate offenses.59
If the majority had concluded that the defendant's actions
amounted to only one ongoing act, the Double Jeopardy Clause would
not automatically have barred convictions for both offenses. In Mis-
souri v. Hunter0 the United States Supreme Court held "that simply
because two criminal statutes may be construed to proscribe the same
conduct under the Blockburger test does not mean that the Double
Jeopardy Clause precludes the imposition, in a single trial, of cumula-
tive punishments pursuant to those statutes." 1 The Court continued:
56. Id. at 93-94.
57. Id. at 94.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The South Carolina Constitution uses the word "lib-
erty" in place of the word "limb." See S.C. CONST. art. I, § 12.
59. Frazier, 397 S.E.2d at 94. The majority reasoned:
The assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct occurred when [the
defendant] grabbed the victim, forced her into the woods and ripped her
clothes in an effort to commit a sexual battery. The [assault and battery of a
high and aggravated nature] occurred when [the defendant] put his knee on
the victim's chest, one hand around her neck and told her he was going to kill
her.... Under this view of the evidence, the threat to kill the victim and the
ensuing assault were not in furtherance of the attempted criminal sexual
conduct.
Id. Justice Finney disagreed and stated, "The record reveals that [the defendant] con-
ducted one ongoing varied assault in furtherance of his intent to commit criminal sexual
conduct." Id. at 95 (Finney, J., dissenting).
60. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
61. Id. at 368. The Blockburger test, derived from Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299 (1932), provides "that where the same act or transaction constitutes a viola-
19911
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Where, as here, a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative pun-
ishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes
proscribe the "same" conduct under Blockburger, a court's task of
statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and
the trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such
statutes in a single trial.62
Therefore, if the Frazier court had found that the evidence indicated
that the defendant's actions constituted only one ongoing act instead
of two separate acts, then the court would have had to examine the
legislative intent behind the offense of assault with intent to commit
criminal sexual conduct and the offense of assault and battery of a
high and aggravated nature to determine whether the legislature in-
tended to provide multiple punishments. However, because the major-
ity found that the defendant's actions were two separate acts, such an
inquiry into the legislative intent was unnecessary.
Michael K. Kocher
IV. CONVICTION FOR OFFENSE AND LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE
CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE ABSENT CONTRARY LEGISLATIVE
INTENT
In Matthews v. State 3 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that principles of double jeopardy prevented the state from convicting
a criminal defendant for both possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute6 ' and trafficking in marijuanas5 when the possession of an
identical amount of marijuana is sufficient to sustain convictions on
both counts. The court concluded that possession with intent to dis-
tribute was a lesser-included offense6" of trafficking based upon posses-
sion. It is now well settled that absent a contrary legislative intent, a
tion of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not." Id. at 304. The Blockburger test is a rule of statutory con-
struction and not a constitutional rule. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368.
62. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-69.
63. 300 S.C. 238, 387 S.E.2d 258 (1990).
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
65. Id. § 44-53-370(e)(1).
66. "The test for determining when a crime is a lesser included offense of the crime
charged is whether the greater of the two offenses includes all the elements of the lesser
offense." State v. Suttles, 279 S.C. 87, 88, 302 S.E.2d 338, 338 (1983) (citing State v.
Fennell, 263 S.C. 216, 209 S.E.2d 433 (1974)).
67. Matthews, 300 S.C. at 241, 387 S.E.2d at 259-60.
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court cannot constitutionally 8 convict a criminal defendant in the
same trial for two offenses when one is a lesser-included offense.69
The trial court convicted David Ray Matthews of possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute and of trafficking in marijuana.
Both convictions rested on his constructive possession of approxi-
mately twenty pounds of marijuana.70 On appeal Matthews contended
that possession with intent to distribute was a lesser-included offense
of trafficking based upon possession and, therefore, the court could not
convict him for both offenses.7 1 The trial court judge rejected this ar-
gument and sentenced Matthews for each conviction. 7 The sentences
were to run consecutively. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed
the decision in a memorandum opinion.73 Matthews subsequently ap-
plied for post conviction relief. The circuit court judge hearing the ap-
plication found that Matthews had received ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. The supreme court affirmed this determination and
agreed to entertain Matthews's double jeopardy claim.
7 4
The supreme court began by stating that for the purposes of
double jeopardy analysis the test" 'to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not.' ,,75 The test, articulated by the United
States Supreme Court and known as the Blockburger rule, serves as an
aid in discerning legislative intent. This determination is crucial be-
cause when a criminal defendant challenges the imposition of cumula-
68. The court refers to "principles of double jeopardy" but does not cite the rele-
vant provisions in the United States or South Carolina Constitution. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 12. From this omission it can be inferred that the South
Carolina Supreme Court interprets the double jeopardy provision of the South Carolina
Constitution in unison with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the
federal provision. The South Carolina Supreme Court need not follow this "lock-step"
approach, so long as the state does not breach the minimum protection provided by the
United States Constitution. State v. Greuling, 257 S.C. 515, 525, 186 S.E.2d 706, 710
(1972) (Bussey, J., dissenting); see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983). The
federal Double Jeopardy Clause is'binding on the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
69. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980); State v. Harkness, 288 S.C.
136, 341 S.E.2d 631 (1986) (per curiam).
70. Brief of Appellant at 3.
71. Record (Vol. 1) at 292-93.
72. The judge reasoned that because possession with intent to distribute contained
an element not required in trafficking, namely an intent to distribute, and because traf-
ficking required possession of at least ten poufids, the offenses were distinct. Id. at 297-
98.
73. State v. Matthews, No. 86-MO-073 (S.C. Feb. 26, 1986) (per curiam).
74. Matthews v. State, 300 S.C. 238, 239, 387 S.E.2d 258, 258-59 (1990).
75. Id. at 240, 387 S.E.2d at 259 (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 304 (1932)).
1991]
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tive punishments based on the same conduct in a single trial, "'the
[d]ouble [leopardy [c]lause does no more than prevent the sentencing
court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature in-
tended.' ,,76 The court eschewed, however, the Blockburger rule by
finding its application unnecessary in light of the clear legislative in-
tent evidenced by the structure of the statute.
7
The court noted the differences between possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute and trafficking in marijuana based solely upon
possession. 8 The former requires "sufficient indicia of intent to dis-
tribute" along with possession;79 the latter requires only the possession
of at least ten pounds.8 0 The court reasoned that because one who pos-
sesses more than ten pounds of marijuana is prima facie guilty of traf-
ficking as well as possession with intent to distribute, the latter is a
lesser-included offense of the former.81 This statutory interrelationship
represents a legislative scheme that imposes penalties based upon the
quantity of marijuana possessed. The court concluded that this struc-
ture revealed that "the General Assembly did not intend to permit
punishment under both statutory provisions" when both charges rested
on the same conduct.82 Rather, the legislature intended a single pun-
ishment based upon the amount of marijuana possessed by the wrong-
doer.83 The court vacated the conviction and sentence for possession
with intent to distribute and affirmed the conviction and sentence for
trafficking.
8 '
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states,
"No person shall be. . . subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb ... ."85 The Double Jeopardy Clause protects
''against 'multiple punishments for the same offense' [being] imposed
in a single proceeding." ' The United States Supreme Court developed
the Blockburger rule in this context as an aid in determining "whether
76. Id. (alteration by court) (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 239-40, 387 S.E.2d at 259.
79. Id. at 239, 387 S.E.2d at 259 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(a)(1) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1990)).
80. Id. at 239-40, 387 S.E.2d at 259 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(e)(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1990)).
81. Id. at 240-41, 387 S.E.2d at 259-60.
82. Id. at 241, 387 S.E.2d at 259.
83. Id.
84. Id., 387 S.E.2d at 260.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The South Carolina Constitution contains an identical
provision, except for the substitution of "liberty" for "limb." See S.C. CONST. art. I, § 12.
86. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). This is not the only protection provided by the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. See id. at 380-81.
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there are two offenses or only one. 1 7 "The assumption underlying the
rule is that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same
offense under two different statutes."88 When an application of the
Blockburger rule leads to the conclusion that "two statutory provisions
proscribe the 'same offense,' they are construed not to authorize cumu-
lative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary leg-
islative intent."89
Recognizing the import of this final qualification is crucial to un-
derstanding the nature of the protection afforded by the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause in the context of the facts in Matthews. The United States
Supreme Court in recent years has emphasized repeatedly that the
Blockburger rule is a rule of statutory construction," and it "must of
course yield to a plainly expressed contrary view on the part of Con-
gress." 91 To understand why this protection should depend upon the
legislature, one must consider "the interest that the Double Jeopardy
Clause seeks to protect."92 When a criminal defendant faces multiple
punishments for the same conduct in a single trial, the clause is
designed "to ensure that sentencing courts do not exceed, by the device
of multiple punishments, the limits prescribed by the legislative
branch of government, in which lies the substantive power to define
crimes and prescribe punishments.
'93
Where . . .a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punish-
ment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes
proscribe the 'same' conduct under Blockburger, a court's task of stat-
utory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the
trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such
statutes in a single trial.94
The Matthews court was faithful to these legal principles. Because
the court decided that the legislative intent was clear from the face of
the statute, application of the Blockburger rule was unnecessary.95 The
court's conclusion that the General Assembly did not intend for a per-
son to be punished for both possession of marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute and for trafficking in marijuana prevented the trial court from
87. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
88. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-92 (1980).
89. Id. at 692.
90. E.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366-67 (1983).
91. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985).
92. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989).
93. Id.
94. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-69. Legislative intent does not play the same determi-
native role in double jeopardy challenges to successive trials for the "same offense." See
Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
95. Matthews v. State, 300 S.C. 238, 240, 387 S.E.2d 258, 259 (1990).
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convicting Matthews under both statutory provisions.
The South Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation of a South
Carolina statute is definitive. The United States Supreme Court is
bound by this determination." The centrality of statutory interpreta-
tion in double jeopardy analysis would have fostered the same finality
had the Matthews court reached a contrary conclusion concerning leg-
islative intent. Thus, if the court had concluded the legislature in-
tended cumulative punishment for both charges based on the same
conduct, the court would have affirmed in full the trial court's decision,
and the Double Jeopardy Clause would have provided no barrier.
9 7
Stanley C. Rodgers
V. ACCIDENTAL SHOOTING IN SELF-DEFENSE RECOGNIZED AS DEFENSE
TO HOMICIDE PROSECUTION
In State v. McCaskill9 the South Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed a defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter and posses-
sion of a weapon during a violent crime because of the trial judge's
erroneous charge to the jury.9 9 The court held that the trial judge
should have instructed the jury that if the defendant lawfully armed
herself in self-defense because of a threat to her safety and the gun
accidentally discharged, the jury must find her not guilty.100
In 1987 the defendant Joyce McCaskill shot and killed Donna
Scott during a domestic quarrel. Following a jury conviction the judge
sentenced McCaskill to a twenty-year prison sentence for voluntary
manslaughter and a concurrent five-year sentence for possession of a
weapon during a violent crime. Throughout the trial the defendant
maintained that she armed herself with a gun to protect herself and
her unborn child. The defendant claimed that she was lawfully entitled
to arm herself in self-defense and that the gun accidentally fired. At
the close of the trial the defendant requested jury instructions on her
right to possess a gun and arm herself in self-defense. The defendant
also requested jury instructions explaining the relationship of this right
to an accidental shooting.
96. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368.
97. See State v. Bolden, 398 S.E.2d 494, 495 (S.C. 1990) (Punishment for both
armed robbery and possession of a weapon is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause
because "[i]t is clear ... the legislature intended to allow cumulative punishment in this
instance.").
98. 300 S.C. 256, 387 S.E.2d 268 (1990).
99. Id. at 259, 387 S.E.2d at 270.
100. Id.
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The trial judge rejected McCaskill's request and gave separate in-
structions on the elements of an accidental killing and a shooting in
self-defense. The judge's self-defense charge focused solely on the right
to use a weapon in self-defense and not on the right to possess a
weapon for protection. The court held that this charge "conveyed to
the jury that [the defendant's] willful act of arming herself foreclosed
the defense of an accidental shooting" and was therefore inadequate.' 0 '
South Carolina recognizes the defense of accident in homicide
cases. In State v. Brown'02 the South Carolina Supreme Court noted
that a homicide is excused if the killer was engaged in a lawful enter-
prise when the killing occurred and the killing was unintentional and
not the result of negligence. 03 In State v. McDanieJ'0 4 the supreme
court held that the defense of accident is not an affirmative defense. In
South Carolina self-defense also is not considered an affirmative de-
fense; therefore, the defendant is not required to prove self-defense by
a preponderance of the evidence. 05 In McCaskill the defendant
claimed that she armed herself in self-defense and the shooting was
accidental. The jury instructions requested by the defendant incorpo-
rated elements of both defenses.
Many courts have addressed the circumstances that entitle a de-
fendant in a prosecution for homicide to jury instructions on both self-
defense and unintentional or accidental homicide. 0 8 Generally courts
that have allowed instructions on these defenses have required some
evidence to support both claims.07 Nonetheless, it is difficult to recon-
cile the inconsistency presented when a defendant claims that he killed
in self-defense and that the killing was accidental. Killing in self-de-
fense is an affirmative and intentional act; an accidental killing is an
unintentional act. However, when a defendant claims that he armed
himself in self-defense and the killing itself was accidental, a court can
reconcile the inconsistency with proper jury instructions. The defend-
ant's main theory remains accident but the claim of self-defense be-
comes relevant in determining whether the defendant acted lawfully.'
101. Id. at 258, 387 S.E.2d at 269.
102. 205 S.C. 514, 32 S.E.2d 825 (1945).
103. Id. at 521, 32 S.E.2d at 828.
104. 68 S.C. 304, 47 S.E. 384 (1904).
105. See State v. Bellamy, 293 S.C. 103, 359 S.E.2d 63 (1987); see also W.
McAN NCH & W. FAnEY, THE CRIbuNAL LAW OF SoUTH CAROLINA 493-97 (2d ed. 1989).
106. See Annotation, Accused's Right, in Homicide Case, to Have Jury Instructed
as to Both Unintentional Shooting and Self-Defense, 15 A.L.R.4TH 983 (1982).
107. See id. at 991-99; State v. Turbeville, 275 S.C. 534, 273 S.E.2d 764 (1981).
108. One authority stated:
Ordinarily the law of self-defense is not applicable in a case of a killing
resulting from an act which was accidental and unintentional, particularly
where the facts of the case are not such as would make such law applicable.
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In reversing McCaskill's conviction, the supreme court reasoned
that McCaskill's claim of self-defense was not inconsistent with her
claim that the shooting was accidental. The defense of accident applies
only if the defendant was acting lawfully;109 therefore, the principles of
self-defense should have been used at trial to determine the lawfulness
of her actions. If McCaskill lawfully armed herself with a gun in self-
defense because of a threat to her safety, the defense of accident would
apply if the gun accidentally discharged.110 Therefore, the court re-
quired that the jury be given an adequate instruction on the defend-
ant's theory of accidental shooting while acting in self-defense,,'
As a result of the holding in McCaskill, defendants in homicide
cases may assert the defense of accidental killing in self-defense. If
enough evidence indicates that defendants have lawfully armed them-
selves in self-defense, but that the killings were accidental, the defend-
ants are entitled to present this theory to the jury."' Separate instruc-
tions on the law of self-defense and the requirements of an accidental
killing may not be sufficient unless they adequately present the de-
fendant's theory. Self-defense instructions should not focus only on the
right to use a weapon. The right to possess a weapon also should be
included. Instructions on the right to possess a weapon in self-defense
will assist the jury in determining whether the defendant was acting
lawfully when the accidental killing occurred.
Michael K. Kocher
However, where the defense of excusable homicide by misadventure is relied
on, the principles of self-defense may be involved, not for the purpose of estab-
lishing defense of self, but for the purpose of determining whether accused was
or was not at the time engaged in a lawful act; and it has been held that in
such case the right, but not the law, of self-defense is invoked. Accused is enti-
tled to an acquittal where he was lawfully acting in self-defense and the death
of his assailant resulted from accident or misadventure.
40 C.J.S. Homicide § 112, at 981-82 (1944) (footnotes omitted).
109. State v. McCaskill, 300 S.C. 256, 259, 387 S.E.2d 268, 270 (1990).
110. "'(A] homicide is excused when caused by the discharge of a gun.. where
the accused is lawfully acting in self-defense and the victim meets death by accident,
through the unintentional discharge of a gun or the like .... .' "Id. at 259, 387 S.E.2d at
270 (emphasis added by court) (quoting 40 Am Jur. 2D Homicide § 112, at 407 (1968)).
111. Id. at 258-59, 387 S.E.2d at 270.
112. The holding in McCaskill does not indicate the amount of evidence needed to
support this theory or if the defendant's testimony alone is sufficient to require jury
instructions on an accidental killing in self-defense. For an analysis of cases in other
jurisdictions addressing this issue, see Annotation, supra note 106.
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